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I.

Introduction

Shelby County v. Holder, the latest Supreme Court decision on voting
rights, is the product of the post-racial movement. 1 As Professor Gilda R.
Daniels has explained, the post-racial movement is founded on the belief that
President Obama’s election in 2008 symbolized the fact that “we have
reached a place in our society where race has lessened in significance,
declaring the country officially post-racial, where race bears little significance
or consequence.” 2 However, from the onset of the post-racial movement,
critics have consistently argued that it would be used to minimize the
ongoing existence, significance, and effect of racism. As noted by Tukufu
Zuberi, a renowned critical race theorist and social scientist:
[T]he
conservative
project
of
associating
colorblindness with racial enlightenment and racial
justice advocacy with grievance politics is a blatant
right-wing move, however, the so-called universal
programs and universal politics advocated by
liberals and many progressives alike are equally
conservative. A more radical perspective views race
as a problem to be overcome. 3
Post-racialism is a result-oriented movement that fails to acknowledge the
reality of ongoing racial disparities in an effort to reestablish white
supremacy. Accordingly, the post-racial movement absolves those privileged
* Attorney, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of General Counsel, Civil Rights and
Finance Law Office. J.D. 2008, Boston College Law School; B.A. 2005, Simmons College. I would
like to thank Professor Anthony Paul Farley for encouraging me to continue writing scholarly
articles and his tireless edits and encouragement. Many thanks to my mother, Johnnie HamiltonMason for her support and being the genesis of this dialogue. The views expressed in this Article
are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of EPA or the United States government.
1 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2620 (2013).
2 Gilda R. Daniels, Racial Redistricting in a Post-Racial World, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 949-950
(2011).
3 Tukufu Zuberi, Critical Race Theory: A Commemoration: Response: Critical Race Theory of
Society, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1573, 1588 (2011)(internal quotation marks omitted).
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by racial disparities without requiring them to fully acknowledge its
enduring existence.
In 2011, Professor Daniels, asked whether “with the Supreme Court’s
construed admonitions against race-conscious redistricting, and its
endorsement of influence districts as a post-racial panacea, how can we
preserve minority electoral opportunities…?” 4 After the Supreme Court’s
decision in Shelby County, we can answer Professor Daniels’ question by
affirmatively stating that minority electoral opportunities can no longer be
preserved with any statute that requires whites to acknowledge racial
inequity in voting. Although white Americans have primarily perpetuated
racism in this nation, they are bystanders to racial oppression, in the sense
that they are unaware of their own complicity, and therefore, struggle to
reconcile it with their racially privileged experience in this nation. 5 The postracial movement has provided an opportunity for white America to avoid the
uncomfortable experience of acknowledging racial oppression, because it
shifts the focus to reconciliation. As demonstrated by the Supreme Court,
evidence of discrimination in voting will continuously be trivialized in a
purportedly post-racial world, where the fundamental presumption is the
declining significance of race.
This Article will examine the post-racial movement’s perpetuation of
racial disparities in voting by means of this denial of the ongoing existence,
significance, and effects of race in this nation. In particular, the post-racial
movement’s effect on the bystander mentality of white America will be
analyzed. Further, this Article argues that Shelby County is an example of
such denial and proposes an amendment to the Voting Rights Act (VRA) 6,
which shifts the burden of protecting equal opportunity to the voting district
as a proactive measure. By not requiring any recognition of ongoing racism,
this approach can be implemented successfully in American society where
acknowledgement has not occurred.
II.

Section 4 and 5 of VRA.

In 1965, Congress enacted the VRA to prevent and remedy racial
discrimination in voting. In particular, the Voting Rights Act states that no:
[V]oting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or
Daniels, supra note 2, at 949 (2011).
Susan J. Brison, Surviving Sexual Violence: A Philosophical Perspective in VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 11, 17 (Stanley G. French, et al. Eds., 1998).
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 et seq.
4
5
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applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color, or in contravention of
the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2). 7
In addition, section 5 of the Voting Rights Act prevents “jurisdictions that
had a voting test and less than 50 percent voter registration or turnout in the
1964 Presidential election” from making changes in their voting procedures
without the approval of either the Attorney General or a court of three
judges. 8 In 1965, the covered jurisdictions included Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, 39 counties in North
Carolina, and 1 county in Arizona. 9 As noted by Professor Daniels, “[s]ection
5’s preclearance requirement is preemptive because it mandates that a
covered jurisdiction demonstrate prior to the enactment of legislation that its
proposed change is free from a discriminatory purpose or effect.” 10
In 2010, Shelby County, Alabama sued the Attorney General in
Federal District Court, seeking a declaratory judgment that sections 4(b) and
5 of the Voting Rights Act are facially unconstitutional and a permanent
injunction against their enforcement. 11 The Federal District Court ruled
against Shelby County, finding that “the evidence before Congress in 2006
was sufficient to justify the reauthorizing §5 and continuing the §4(b)
coverage formula.” 12 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit (U.S. Court of Appeals) affirmed the decision of the Federal District
Court. 13 In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of
certiorari to review the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals, finding section
4(b) of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional. 14
III.

Critical Analysis of Shelby County and Bystander Denial.

The Supreme Court in a five-four decision reversed the decision of the
U.S. Court of Appeals. Chief Justice Roberts in the opinion of the court held
that the only compelling interest justifying the preclearance remedy and
coverage formula was the existence of gross voting disparities defined by race
Enforcement of Voting Rights, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973(a) (1965).
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2620.
9 Id. at 2620 (noting that the Voting Rights Act was reauthorized for an additional 5 years in
1970; 7 years in 1975; 25 years in 1982; and 25 years in 2006).
10 Daniels, supra note 2, at 955.
11 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2621- 2622.
12 Id. at 2622.
13 Id.
14 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2631 (2013).
7
8
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in the covered states. 15 Despite the Justice Department’s explanation of the
deterrent effect of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and its contention that
“there need not be any logical relationship between the criteria in the
formula and the reason for coverage,” the Supreme Court’s apparent reason
for finding section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional is their
belief that:
Coverage today is based on decades-old data
and eradicated practices. The formula
captures States by reference to literacy tests
and low voter registration and turnout in the
1960s and early 1970s. But such tests have
been banned nationwide for over 40 years.
And voter registration and turnout numbers
in the covered States have risen dramatically
in the years alone. 16
In particular, the Supreme Court noted that over the course of the nearly 50
years since the VRA was enacted “things have changed dramatically.” 17
The Supreme Court ignored substantial evidence of ongoing
discrimination in the covered jurisdictions. 18 Congress found that “vestiges of
discrimination in voting continue to exist as demonstrated by second
generation barriers constructed to prevent minority voters from fully
participating in the electoral process.” 19 Specifically, Congress explained that
the term first generation barriers, “describes barriers to registration and the
ability to cast a vote,” while the term second-generation barriers:
Refers to other means of depriving minority voters
of the opportunity to participate in the democratic
process on an equal basis--means such as
discriminatory management of district lines, the
adoption of at-large election schemes, and other
dilutive techniques. 20
In its brief, the Justice Department cited several instances where
states or municipalities took actions that impaired or limited the voting
Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2617.
Id. at 2627- 2628.
17 Id. at 2625.
18 Brief of Respondent at 21, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96), 2012 U.S.
Briefs 96, at 21.
19 Id. at 21.
20 Id.
15
16
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power of blacks. In one case, the “all-white incumbent town governance in
Kilmichael, Mississippi, attempted to cancel an election shortly after black
citizens had become a majority of the registered voters.” 21 In another case,
the location of the polling place was changed and the Attorney General
objected to the relocation of a polling place in Johnson County, Georgia, from
the county courthouse to the American Legion, noting that “the American
Legion in [that county] has a wide-spread reputation as an all-white club
with a history of refusing membership to black applicants” and was “used for
functions to which only whites are welcome.” 22
Shelby County itself had been a defendant in a suit brought to enforce
Section 2 of the VRA. 23 The result of that suit was a finding that the
Alabama legislature had intentionally discriminated against AfricanAmerican voters by authorizing counties to switch from single-member
districts to at-large voting, prohibiting single-shot voting in at-large elections,
and requiring numbered posts in at-large elections. 24 Moreover, in 2006,
“Congress also gathered thousands of pages of testimony and documents
chronicling ongoing problems of vote suppression, voter intimidation, and
vote dilution throughout covered jurisdictions.” 25
In reviewing Shelby, the Supreme Court intentionally departed from
the standard it articulated in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, “Congress may
use ‘any rational means’ to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial
discrimination in voting.” 26 In particular, the Supreme Court deviated from
47 years of precedent with respect to the VRA in Shelby, and relied on the
less deferential standard explained in City of Boerne v. Flores, which required
that enforcement legislation be based on a congruent and proportional
relationship between a constitutional injury and the means adopted to
prevent that injury. 27 However, the standard established in City of Boerne
was a particularly inappropriate vehicle for reviewing the VRA, because the

Id. at 24.
Brief of Respondent at 27, Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96), 2012 U.S. Briefs 96,
at 27.
23 See Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 640 F. Supp. 1347, 1356-1360 (M.D. Ala. 1986).
24 Brief of Respondent at 27, Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96), 2012 U.S. Briefs 96,
at 38.
25 Id. at 33.
26 Jason J. Kelly, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is No Longer Tailored to Remedy Current
Patterns of Voting Discrimination: The State of Section 5 after Northwest Austin Utility District
No. 1 v. Holder, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 67, 75 (2011) (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
324 (1966)).
27 See id. at 77 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1977)).
21
22
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case involved a challenge to a local historical preservation ordinance on the
basis of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 28
One possible explanation for the majority’s opinion in Shelby County is
bystander denial. In Surviving Sexual Violence: A Philosophical Perspective,
Susan J. Brinson articulates her theory that bystanders in cases of sexual
violence have to struggle to identify with victims because of their inability to
reconcile such acts with their perception of the world. 29 Specifically,
Professor Brinson explains that:
Where
the
facts
would
appear
to
be
incontrovertible, denial takes shape of attempts to
explain the assault in ways that leave the
observers’ worldview unscathed. Even those who
are able to acknowledge the existence of violence
try to protect themselves from the realization that
the world in which it occurs is their world and so
they find it hard to identify with the victim. They
cannot allow themselves to imagine the victim’s
shattered life, or else their illusions about their
own safety and control over their lives might begin
to crumble. 30
Bystander denial is not limited to incidents of sexual violence. It
occurs in all sociopolitical contexts in which there is a victim of any form of
oppression. White Americans, in particular, suffer from profound bystander
denial with respect to racial oppression. Furthermore, white Americans are
unable to fully absorb the magnitude of racism in this country because they
are unaware of their bystander denial. It is impossible for them to recognize
that their understanding of the world is a consequence of racial privilege, not
an objective reality. As explained by Paulo Freire:
To the oppressor consciousness, the humanization
of the ‘others,’ of the people, appears not as the
pursuit of full humanity, but as subversion. The
oppressors do not perceive their monopoly on
having more as a privilege, which dehumanizes
others and themselves. They cannot see that, in the
egoistic pursuit of having as a possessing class,
Kelly, supra note 26, at 77.
Brison, supra note 5, at 17.
30 Id.
28
29
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they suffocate in their own possessions and no
longer are; they merely have. For them, having
more is an inalienable right, a right they acquired
through their own ‘effort,’ with their ‘courage to
take risks.’ 31
Paulo Freire describes the blindness and self-delusion, born of self-interest
that privilege creates. The acquisition of power, a monopoly on the voting
franchise is one more “possession” and privilege to which they are entitled.
This distorted reality of white Americans undermines their ability to
appreciate the severity of all forms of voting discrimination and to relegate it
to the past, to the first generation barriers. As noted by Joel Heller, a voting
rights scholar, the likelihood of denial increases when “the potential
abridgement does not take the form of an explicit denial of access to the ballot
box but instead stems from structural choices like the location of polling sites
(…), or a practice that dilutes the value of a vote, such as redistricting or
annexation.” 32 Under these circumstances, policymakers may try to escape
the shame or the aggravation of reminders of the era of rampant racial
discrimination by claiming those problems no longer exist. 33 Within the
context of racial discrimination, the media has captured elected officials
making innumerable attempts to rationalize widespread racism within “their
world” context.
For example, on August 14, 2013, Senator Rand Paul (R-Ky.) stated
“[s]o really, I don't think there is objective evidence that we're precluding
African-Americans from voting any longer.” 34 Likewise, on the July 25, 2013
edition of Fox News' America Live conservative Washington Post columnist
Marc Thiessen, he contended: “voter ID laws do not disenfranchise
anybody.” 35 To racially oppressed populations, these statements seem
absurd, but to white Americans with bystander denial, such propositions
support their understanding of the world. The only facts that registered
with these speakers might have been the election of a black president, Barack
Obama, and the size of the turn-out of black and latino voters, which was
PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 58-59 (2005).
Joel Heller, Falkner’s Voting Rights Act: The Sound and Fury of Section Five, 40 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 929, 952-53 (2012).
33 Id.
34 Paige Lavender, Rand Paul: There's No “Objective Evidence” Of Racial Discrimination in
Elections, HUFFINGTON POST (August 14, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/14/randpaul-racial-discrimination_n_3758035.html.
35 Sergio Munoz, Fox Uses Bogus Arguments to Attack DOJ Voting Rights Action against Texas,
MEDIA MATTERS (July 25, 2013), http://mediamatters.org/tags/marc-thiessen.
31
32
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thought to propel his election. The reports of the strategies used to suppress
that vote and the strategies used to deter voters are dismissed out of hand.
Studies of bystander denial support the conclusion that many white
Americans, like bystanders to sexual violence, find it less challenging to
acknowledge racism and discrimination remote historical incidents which are
thought to be outside of “their world” context. The limited contexts in which
the Supreme Court has found there to be a compelling interest for race-based
decision making is evidence of the resistance on the part of a majority of the
justices to the idea that racism and discrimination are contemporary
problems. For example in Fullilove v. Klutznick, the Supreme Court “upheld
a congressional preference for minority contractors because the measure was
legitimately designed to ameliorate the present effects of past
discrimination.” 36 Likewise in University of California Regents v. Bakke,
Four Members of the Court concluded that, while
racial distinctions are irrelevant to nearly all
legitimate state objectives and are properly
subjected to the most rigorous judicial scrutiny in
most instances, they are highly relevant to the one
legitimate state objective of eliminating the
pernicious vestiges of past discrimination. 37
Nonetheless, the compelling interest that the Supreme Court has
found in eliminating the current effects of past discrimination has never
extended the diversity paradigm or principle outside the educational
context. 38 As explained by Vicki Lens, a social policy scholar:
An important rationale for upholding the plan in
Johnson was that it was designed to ‘attain a
balanced work force, not to maintain one.’ This
distinction between ‘attaining’ and ‘maintaining’
was crucial to the Court's narrative of substantive
equality. It reiterated it several times, thus making
it clear that affirmative action was intended as a
temporary measure to compensate for past
exclusions and not to assure diversity for diversity's
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 301 (1986) (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 492 (1980)).
37 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 302, citing Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362.
38 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003); see also Vicki Lens, Supreme Court
Narratives on Equality and Gender Discrimination in Employment: 1971-2002, 10 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 501, 541-42 (2004).
36
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sake. Thus, the Court rejected a difference theory
approach that would legitimize diversity as an end
in itself. 39
The majority opinion in Shelby County, exhibits the Supreme Court’s
enduring reluctance to sustain racial diversity in voting “for diversity’s sake.”
However, this creates a potentially untenable predicament where the
Supreme Court is unwilling to acknowledge the existence of voting
discrimination, in part because their understanding of racism is “shaped by
the most extreme expressions of individual bigotry,” but also unwilling to
uphold proactive programs to prevent discrimination. 40 What is the future of
voting rights in this country where the Supreme Court has ruled that the
coverage formula identified in section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act is
unconstitutional because occurrences of voting discrimination in the covered
jurisdictions have declined but are not obsolete?
IV.

Equal Opportunity in Voting: a New Method of Preventing
Discrimination.

In this social climate, the VRA must be amended to establish an
affirmative program that does not explicitly or implicitly rely on recognition
of ongoing discrimination in voting. Although the coverage formula set out in
sections 4(b) and the preclearance requirement of section 5 of the VRA
effectively prevented discrimination before Shelby County, these tools may
not be useful in the future given the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that
it recognizes only the most overt or explicit forms of voter suppression as
enforceable discrimination. 41
Title VII of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”)
offers a plausible solution to this predicament. Section 717 of Title VII states
that the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is responsible for
the annual review and approval of a national and regional equal employment
opportunity plan submitted by all federal agencies. 42
Pursuant to
Management Directive 715, “[a]gencies have an ongoing obligation to
eliminate barriers that impede free and open competition in the workplace
and prevent individuals of any racial or national origin group or either sex
Lens, supra note 38, at 541-42 (citing Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987)).
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 183-84 (2012).
41 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2629 (“no one can fairly say that it shows anything approaching
the ‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’ ‘widespread,’ and ‘rampant’ discrimination that faced Congress in 1965,
and that clearly distinguished the covered jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation at that time.”).
42 Employment by Federal Government, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16(b) (1964).
39
40
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from realizing their full potential.” 43 Agencies are required to conduct a selfassessment of their workforce, in which they identify potential barriers to
equal employment based on lower than anticipated demographic data. 44
Specifically, agencies must analyze their new hire, promotion, and
senior grades data categorized by major job series and race/national
origin/sex at every stage of personnel transaction (i.e. relevant civilian labor
force, application, qualification, and selection rates) to determine if there is a
barrier to equal employment opportunity. For example, the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission advises that a race/national origin/sex
group’s application rate in a particular job series that is lower than the
groups representation in the relevant civilian labor force is problematic and
requires an agency to investigate whether there is a barrier to equal
employment opportunity by planning activities that address the
representational disparity. 45
In light of the Supreme Court’s finding that section 4(b) of the Voting
Rights Act is unconstitutional, the VRA should be amended to include an
affirmative process that is analogous to the one described in Section 717 of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Annual reporting requirements that
mandate that each voting district compare the race/national origin/sex
demographic data of the potential voter pool to the voter participation rate.
Guidance can be issued that requires a voting district to determine if there is
a barrier to equal opportunity in voting if the voter participation rate of a
particular race/national origin/sex demographic group is less than their
representation in the potential voting pool. In such situations, voting
districts, like federal agencies, should be required to create and implement
programs that facilitate voting by underrepresented race/national origin/sex
demographic groups. Voting districts should be required to submit annual
compliance reports to the U.S. Department of Justice, which would maintain
federal oversight over voting discrimination.
V.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s failure to recognize the enduring significance of
discrimination in voting is misguided. However, their reasoning in Shelby
County is embraced by many members of white America and is not limited to
Memorandum to Heads of Federal Agencies, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
(October 1, 2003), http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/directives/md715.cfm.
44 Id.
45 Memorandum to Heads of Federal Agencies, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
(October 1, 2003), http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/directives/md715.cfm.
43
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voting discrimination. The ongoing marginalization of oppressed populations
has effectively precluded white America from understanding the existence,
significance, and effect of race in this nation. Furthermore, the perpetuation
of the post-racial movement coupled with bystander denial has exacerbated
white America’s inability to recognize and appreciate modern-day racial
oppression. Accordingly, the VRA must be amended to create an affirmative
program that ensures equal opportunity in voting that avoids the use of
discretion, which will undoubtedly minimize the severity of discrimination.
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